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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a new decoder for probabilistic binary traitor
tracing codes which is based on classical hypothesis testing and es-
timation theory. This new decoder is blind, in the sense of ignoring
a priori the collusion attack it is facing. It basically performs a joint
estimation of the collusion channel and the probability that each user
takes part in the collusion. The experimental results shown in the pa-
per have been obtained with the classical Tardos code, although the
proposed decoder works with arbitrary probabilistic binary codes.
Another remarkable advantage of this blind decoder is its ability to
successfully cope with collusion channels far more general than the
classical Marking Assumption, including channels that produce era-
sures and random decoding errors.
Index Terms— Traitor tracing, Tardos code, collusion channel
estimation, likelihood ratio, optimal decoding.
1. INTRODUCTION
Probabilistic codes, which have been recently introduced in the ﬁeld
of traitor tracing, are beginning to be well understood. Since the
seminal work by Tardos [1], a number of works studying their prop-
erties and fundamental limits have blossomed out during the last
years [2],[3]. However, these works mostly address the issue of cod-
ing performance assuming that a “joint” decoder will do the accusa-
tion work. Joint decoders, which have been recently proved optimal
in an information-theoretic framework [4], [2], [3], [5], perform joint
accusations considering groups of colluders. The main problem with
joint decoders is that they are too complex to implement in practice.
To the best of our knowledge, all traitor tracing decoders available in
the literature belong to the class of “simple decoders”, i.e. they out-
put decisions for each user independently of the others. This class
of decoders, albeit suboptimal, is affordable from the computational
point of view.
In this paper we are concerned with “simple” decoding of proba-
bilistictraitortracingcodes, suchasthatproposedbyTardos[1]. The
decoding algorithms proposed by Tardos [1] and Skoric [6] pose the
remarkable property of providing stable performance independently
of the collusion channel, provided that the latter fulﬁlls the so-called
“marking assumption” [7]. This decoding strategy can be consid-
ered as “agnostic”, since it does not use any information about the
collusion channel. We will refer to it in the sequel simply as “Tar-
dos decoding”. The main advantages of these decoders are that they
are simple to implement and that the bound on the minimal code
length for satisfying a required error probability holds whatever the
 The ﬁrst author performed this work while at Thomson Security Lab.
collusion attack. However, this decoding strategy suffers from three
major drawbacks:
1. Tardos decoding has a too strong coupling between the accu-
sation algorithm and the code generation, since it is designed
to work with an speciﬁc time-sharing distribution, which is
the one originally proposed by Tardos. However, some recent
works have shown, from a game-theoretic viewpoint, that the
optimal time-sharing distribution is strongly dependent on the
number of colluders. In such conditions, the stable perfor-
mance property of the agnostic decoder is no longer granted.
2. When the collusion strategy deviates from the marking as-
sumption, performance stability for the agnostic decoder does
not hold. For instance, when the channel introduces random
errors, decoding performance rapidly decreases, even if the
errors occur with very small probability. This is not surpris-
ing as the code construction and the agnostic decoders were
originally designed for solving the Boneh-Shaw problem [7].
3. The agnostic decoders are suboptimal from a hypothesis test-
ing theory viewpoint, especially as the number of colluders
increases, as shown in [8].
Thus, although the code construction is provably good, Tardos
decoding is in general highly suboptimal. The approach proposed in
this paper is radically different in that it relies essentially on maxi-
mum likelihood decoding, although important relaxations are intro-
duced in order to lower the decoding complexity. The decoder pre-
sented in this paper is basically a simpliﬁed version of the iterative
decoderproposedin[8], whichwasshowntooutperformtheexisting
Tardos decoders. Such iterative decoder performs a joint estimation-
decoding by means of the well known Expectation-Maximization
algorithm [9], where some simpliﬁcations are introduced. Even with
such simpliﬁcations, the complexity of the iterative decoder makes
it not suitable to scenarios where a huge number of users is involved.
The present decoder introduces further simpliﬁcations that lower de-
coding complexity, at the expense of a presumable performance loss.
Although the decoder is applicable to arbitrary probabilistic traitor
tracing codes, we focus without loss of generality on the continuous
time-sharing distribution proposed by Tardos [1]. The achievable
rate of the resulting code has been studied in [10]. As will be seen,
using the proposed decoder is possible to work at rates close to the
theoretical upper limit, whilst providing small error probabilities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides
the required mathematical formulation of the problem. Section 3
presents the rationale of our decoding approach and the details of
the proposed decoder. Section 4 is concerned with the experimental
evaluation, and ﬁnally Section 5 gives some concluding remarks.2. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The basic notation that will be used throughout the paper is as fol-
lows. The number of users and the length of the code are denoted
by n and m, respectively. Thus, the coding rate is given by R =
log(n)/m. The probability that the random variable A deﬁned over
the alphabet A takes the occurrence a is denoted by PA[a]. The car-
dinality of the set A is denoted by |A|. Vectors and matrices are
written in boldface.
2.1. Code generation
We brieﬂy remind how the Tardos code is designed. The binary
code X is composed of n sequences of m bits. The sequence
xj = (xj1,··· ,xjm) identifying user j is composed of m binary
symbols. Indeed, these symbols are drawn independently such that
PXji[1] = pi,  i = 1,...,m. The values {Pi}i=1,...,m are in-
dependent and identically distributed auxiliary random variables
in the range [0,1]: Pi   f(p). Tardos proposed the following
pdf, f(p) = ( 
 
p(1   p)
 1, which is symmetric around 1/2:
f(p) = f(1   p). It means that symbols ‘1’ and ‘0’ play a similar
role with probability p or 1 p. The actual occurrences {pi}i=1,...,m
of these random variables are drawn once for all at the initializa-
tion of the code, and they constitute its secret key which is shared
between encoder and decoder.
2.2. The collusion channel
Denote the subset of colluder indices by C = {j1,··· ,jc}, and
xC = {xj1,...,xjc} the restriction of the traitor tracing code to
this subset. The collusion attack is the process of taking sequences
in xC as inputs and yielding the pirated sequence y as an output.
The symbols yi belong to an alphabet Y = {0,1,...,|Y|}, which
is not necessarily binary.
Our mathematical model of the collusion is essentially based
on four main assumptions. The ﬁrst assumption is the “memory-
less” nature of the collusion attack. Since the symbols of the code
are independent, it seems relevant that the pirated sequence Y also
shares this property. Therefore, the value of Yi only depends on
{Xj1i,··· ,Xjci}.
The second assumption is the “stationarity” of the collusion pro-
cess. We assume that the collusion strategy is independent of the
index i in the sequence. Therefore, we can describe it for any index
i, and we will drop indexing for sake of clarity in the sequel.
The third assumption is the “exchangeable” nature of the collu-
sion: the colluders select the value of the symbol Y depending on
the values of their symbols, but not on their order. Therefore, the in-
put of the collusion process is indeed the type of their symbols (i.e.
the empirical probability mass function). For binary codes, this type
is fully deﬁned by the following sufﬁcient statistic: the number  i
of symbols ‘1’:  i =
 c
k=1 Xjki.
The fourth assumption is that the collusion process may be de-
terministic (e.g. majority vote, minority vote), or “random” (for in-
stance, the symbol pasted in the pirated sequence is decided upon a
coin ﬂip). These four assumptions yield that the collusion attack is
fully described by a parameter   which is in turn a concatenation of
parameter vectors as follows:   = ( [1], [2],..., [|Y|]), where
 [y] = (PY [y|  = 0],...,PY [y|  = c]), for y   Y. (1)
There is thus an inﬁnity of collusion attacks, but all of them are de-
ﬁned by (c + 1)|Y| real values in the hypercube [0,1]
(c+1)|Y|. In
general,   is restricted to some subset P
c of [0,1]
(c+1)|Y| deﬁned as
P
c   {    [0,1]
(c+1)|Y| such that dist(xC,y) <  ,
 
y Y
PY [y| ] = 1, for all   = 0,...,c}. (2)
where dist(xC,y) is an appropriately deﬁned distortion metric and
  the admissible distortion. Notice also that the number of degrees of
freedom in   is in general much lower than (c+1)|Y|. For instance,
if Y = {0,1}, then   has no more than c+1 degrees of freedom
because PY [0|  =  ] + PY [1|  =  ] = 1.
2.3. Decoding and error measures
Once the sequence y is extracted from the pirated content, a decod-
ing algorithm assigns to each sequence {xj}i=1,...,m a score. User
j is deemed guilty if the score of xj is above a certain threshold  .
Let ˆ C be the estimated set of colluders. Two error events are deﬁned:
• False alarm: at least one innocent user belongs to ˆ C.
• False negative: none of the colluders is caught, i.e. C  ˆ C =  .
ErrorprobabilitiesarecorrespondinglydenotedbyPFA( ), PFN( ).
The most popular decoding algorithm is the symmetric version
of the Tardos decoding function proposed by B. Skoric et al. [6].
3. THE JOINT ESTIMATOR-DECODER
3.1. Main rationale: the informed decoder
According to classical hypothesis testing theory [11, Chap. 12], the
accusation is formulated as a test based on the observations (xj,y)
that consists of checking which of the two following hypothesis is
true:
• H0: User j is innocent,
• H1: User j is a colluder.
The Neyman-Pearson theorem tells us that the optimal hypothesis
testing is implemented by means of the log-likelihood ratio test:
L(y,xj) =
1
m
log
 
PY,Xj|H1[y,xj|p, ]
PY,Xj|H0[y,xj|p, ]
 
. (3)
Under hypothesis H0, y and xj are statistically independent, so the
above expression can be simpliﬁed to
L(y,xj) =
1
m
m  
i=1
log
 
PYi|[yi|xji,pi, ]
PYi[yi|pi, ]
 
. (4)
Let us deﬁne the vector q (pi) as
q (pi)   (P [0|pi],...,P [c|pi]), (5)
with P [ |pi] = (
c
 )p
 
i (1   pi)
c   the probability that c colluders
have   times the symbol ‘1’ at index i, conditioned on pi. Hence,
PYi[yi|pi, ] =
c  
 =0
PYi[yi| ]P i[ |pi] =  [yi]q
T
 (pi), (6)
where superindex
T means transposed. The other conditional prob-
ability involved in (4) is given by
PYi[yi|x,pi, ] =
c 1+x  
 =x
PYi[yi| ]
 c 1
  x
 
p
  x
i (1   pi)
c 1+2x  .
(7)
Unfortunately, this optimal decoder is not applicable as such in prac-
tice, since it needs to know in advance the collusion channel  . This
problem is tackled below.3.2. The blind decoder
We proposed in [8] a blind decoder that performs iteratively a
joint estimation of the collusion channel and the probability of be-
ing guilty for each user. Such decoder, based on the well-known
Expectation-Maximization algorithm [9], allows to approximate
the performance of the optimal informed decoder. Nonetheless, its
computational complexity is prohibitive when applied to scenarios
where a huge number of users is involved, since in each iteration
we must optimize a function whose evaluation requires O(nmc)
elementary operations. Performing an accusation with the blind
decoder presented here is comprised of three steps.
3.2.1. Step 1
The ﬁrst step consists in estimating the collusion channel relying
only on the pirated sequence y and the secret sequence p shared be-
tween encoder and decoder. We take advantage of the fact that infor-
mation about the collusion strategy leaks from the observed {y,p}.
Assuming the collusion was performed by k dishonest users, the ﬁrst
step is formulated as a Maximum Likelihood estimator:
ˆ  
k
= arg max
  Pk J( ). (8)
Let us deﬁne Lj as the set of indices where the pirated sequence y
has the symbol j   Y. J( ) can be compactly expressed as
J( ) =
 
j Y
 
i Lj
log( [j]q
T
 (pi)), (9)
where  [j] and q
T
 (pi) have been deﬁned in (1) and (5), respec-
tively. The functional J( ) is concave in  , so the problem is a con-
vex problem, subject to a convex constraint as long as P
c is convex.
Therefore, it can be solved by standard convex optimization meth-
ods. In particular, we have chosen a constrained conjugate gradient
descent algorithm. Since we ignore a priori the number of colluders,
c, we perform the optimization (8) for a range of collusion sizes, thus
producing a set of candidate collusion channels {ˆ  
1
,..., ˆ  
cmax}.
3.2.2. Step 2
In the second step, the blind decoder performs a joint estimation
of the most likely colluders and the most likely collusion channel
among the candidates. For a given ˆ  
k
, the probability that user j is
guilty can be computed as
 j(ˆ  
k
) = P[H1|y,xj,p, ˆ  
k
]
=
PY|Xj,H1[y|xj,p, ˆ  
k
]P[H1]
PY|Xj,H1[y|xj,p,ˆ  
k
]P[H1] + PY|Xj,H0[y|xj,p,ˆ  
k
]P[H0]
. (10)
Since we assume there are k colluders out of n users, we have
P[H1] = k/n and P[H0] = 1   k/n, and we arrive at
 j(ˆ  
k
) =
k
k + (n   k)
PY[y|p, ˆ  
k
]
PY|Xj,H1[y|xj,p, ˆ  
k
]
. (11)
The probabilities appearing in this last equation have already been
expressed in Sect. 3.1. Now, deﬁne the random variable Sj that takes
the values 1 or 0, respectively, when user j is a colluder or an inno-
cent. We compute an approximation to the likelihood of ˆ  
k
given
the codebook as
1
Q(ˆ  
k
) = log
 
PY[y|p, ˆ  
k
]
 
(12)
+
n  
j=1
 j(ˆ  
k
)log
 
PXj,Sj[xj,1|y,p, ˆ  
k
]
 
+
n  
j=1
(1    j(ˆ  
k
))log
 
PXj,Sj[xj,0|y,p, ˆ  
k
]
 
.
With some more work:
PXj,Sj[xj,0|y,p, ˆ  
k
]
= (1  
k
n
)PXj[xj|p] = (1  
k
n
)
m  
i=1
p
x
i (1   pi)
(1 x), (13)
PXj,Sj[xj,1|y,p, ˆ  
k
]
=
k
n
·
PY|Xj,H1[y|xj,p, ˆ  
k
]PXj[xj|p]
PY[y|p, ˆ  
k
]
(14)
3.2.3. Step 3
We select the index of the most likely collusion channel as
ˆ c = arg max
k=1,...,cmax
Q(ˆ  
k
), (15)
Finally, we estimate the group of colluders as
ˆ C = {j   {1,...,n} such that  j(ˆ  
ˆ c
) >  }. (16)
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We consider several scenarios of practical relevance that illustrate
how powerful is the proposed blind decoder. In all cases, its perfor-
mance is compared to that of the optimal (informed) decoder and the
Tardos decoder. For the latter, we have implemented the symmetric
version proposed by Skoric et al [6], which has been shown to im-
prove signiﬁcantly the original proposal by Tardos [1]. The value of
the variable cmax, introduced in Sect. 3.2.1 is ﬁxed to 10 in all cases.
4.1. Marking Assumption
This is the classical Boneh-Shaw problem [7]. The colluders forge
the pirated sequence y by assembling pieces from their personal
copies. Obviously, Y = {0,1}. The following simpliﬁcations hold:
1. The parameter vector deﬁning the collusion channel is com-
pletely deﬁned by  [1]. Thus, there are no more than c + 1
degrees of freedom.
2. The Marking Assumption enforces that PY [1|  = 0] = 0
and PY [1|  = c] = 1. Hence, the number of degrees of
freedom is actually c   1.
2
1Details will be given in the journal version, currently under preparation.
2This restriction has not been implemented in our practical evaluation.
Notice that better results could have been obtained in such case.10
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Fig. 1. Decoding performance under the Marking Assumption for
c = 8, n = 10
5, m = 4500.
Fig. 1 shows the plot of PFA( ) vs. PFN( ) in different scenarios.
In one case, the colluders apply the Worst Case Attack, which is the
attack minimizing the achievable rate of the code [10]. In the other
case, they simply apply a “coin ﬂip attack” [10], i.e. they decide the
output bit upon a coin ﬂip whenever they are allowed by the Marking
assumption. Notice in all cases the stability of Tardos decoding, and
the big gap with regard to the optimal and blind decoders.
4.2. Marking Assumption + random errors
The pirated sequence y, forged as in Sect.4.1, undergoes a posteriori
a binary symmetric channel (BSC) that ﬂips with probability   the
bits in y independently for each index i   {1,...,m}. Yet the out-
put alphabet remains Y = {0,1}. Note that Marking Assumption
no longer holds, i.e. PY [1|  = 0]   0 and PY [1|  = c]   1. This
model is applicable, for instance, to multimedia scenarios where
each bit of the sequences xj is embedded in one block of the multi-
media content by means of a watermarking technique, and the col-
luders forge the pirated content by exchanging their blocks and ap-
plying some postprocessing like a lossy compression. Fig. 2 shows
the value of PFA as a function of   when PFN is ﬁxed to a given
value and there are c = 3 colluders applying the Worst Case Attack.
The code length in all cases is chosen so that the rate is 50% of the
theoretical achievable rate.
4.3. Marking assumption + erasures
The colluders apply now a compound attack. With probability
PE[e| ], they put a symbol which is neither a ‘0’ nor a‘1’, so it is
treated as an erasure. With probability 1   PE[e| ], they apply a
majority attack, i.e. they put the most frequent symbol they have.
Thus, the output alphabet becomes Y = {0,1,e}. This setup is
applicable to traitor tracing scenarios with multimedia content:
1. The ﬁngerprinted copy of user j is generated by dividing the
content into nonoverlapping blocks, and embedding in each
block one bit of xj with a zero-bit watermarking scheme.
Two different secret keys are used for embedding 0 or 1 cor-
respondingly.
2. The colluders generate the pirated content by averaging their
copies with equal weights, and then they apply a lossy com-
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Fig. 2. Probability of false alarm under Marking Assumption fol-
lowed by a binary symmetric channel with parameter  . c = 3,
n = 10
4.
pression. We assume that the bit with the highest energy has
a higher probability of being detected
3.
3. The watermark detector recovers the bit embedded in each
block of the pirated copy. In some blocks it does not detect
any bit due to the lossy compression; in some other blocks
it detects both bits. If any of this things happen, then the
decoder declares an erasure.
In the experiments, we evaluate an scenario with c = 7 col-
luders. In the parameter vector deﬁning the collusion channel,  [0]
and  [1] model the averaging operation, whereas  [e] models the
lossy compression, for which we have chosen  [e] = (1    e, 1  
0.85 e, 1 0.7 e, 1 0.6 e, 1 0.6 e, 1 0.7 e, 1 0.85 e, 1 
 e). Parameter  e   [0,1] is used to tune the probability of having
an erasure, PE[e] = EP{ [e]q
T
 (p)}, where EP{} denotes expec-
tation in P. PE[e] increases as  e decreases. For the chosen  [e], the
probability of having an erasure increases as   approaches  /2; the
rationaleisthattheaveragingoperationreducestheenergyofthebits
embedded in each block when they are different (i.e. 0 <   < 1).
Fig. 3 shows the probability of false alarm as a function of PE[e]
when PFN is ﬁxed to a 0.02 and 0.005. The coding rate lies between
30 and 50% of the achievable rate for the considered collusion chan-
nels. As can be seen, the performance of the blind decoder degrades
smoothlyastheprobabilityoferasureisincreased, anditserrorprob-
ability is always remarkably lower than that of the Tardos decoder,
for which PFA   1 in all cases. Notice that the Tardos decoder
simply disregards the indices containing an erasure.
4.4. Marking assumption + erasures + double symbols
The experimental setup is the same as in Sect. 4.3, but when the
watermark detector detects more than one bit in the ith block of the
content, its output yi is then a “double symbol” d. Hence, the output
alphabet is comprised now of four symbols: Y = {0,1,e,d}.
We evaluate an scenario with c = 7 colluders, with  [d] =
(0, 0.27 (1 0.85 s), 0.53 (1 0.7 s), 0.8 (1 0.6 s), 0.8 
(1 0.6 s), 0.53 (1 0.7 s), 0.27 (1 0.85 s), 0). Finally,
 [e] and  s are ﬁxed so that the probability of detecting an erasure
3This would be the case if the bits were embedded with an spread spec-
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Fig. 4. Decoding performance under Marking Assumption + era-
sures + double detections, for c = 7, m = 900, and n = 10
4 users.
or a double symbol given   is the same as PE[e| ] in Sect. 4.3.
Hence, some erasures obtained in Sect. 4.3 remain as erasures but
others are transformed into double symbols. Results are shown in
Fig. 4. A comparison between the latter and Fig. 3 reveals that the
blind decoder is able to successfullytake advantage ofthis additional
information, as PFA is in general signiﬁcantly lower in Fig. 4 than in
Fig. 3. However, for small probability of erasure or double symbol
(leftpartofthecurves), performanceissimilarorslightlyworse. The
reason could be that the number of samples with erasures and double
symbols in such case is too small so as to estimate the collusion
channel with sufﬁcient accuracy. As for the Tardos decoder, since it
disregards indices with both erasures and double symbols, it remains
stuck at PFA   1 as in Fig. 3. The coding rate lies between 30% and
40% of the achievable rate for the considered collusion channels.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The blind decoder for probabilistic traitor tracing codes presented
in this paper has shown promising results through its application to
a classical Tardos code. Although the gap with regard to the opti-
mal decoder is signiﬁcant in some cases, its performance is (at the
cost of some additional but affordable computational complexity) re-
markablybetterthanthatoftheexistingTardosdecoder, whichsofar
is the main reference in the ﬁeld. Besides its good performance, the
blind decoder posesother advantages such as the possibilityof work-
ing with arbitrary probabilistic binary codes (not only the Tardos
code), and the ability of successfully managing random errors, era-
sures and double symbols. Hence, it encompasses many more traitor
tracing scenarios than the classical Marking Assumption for which
the classical Tardos decoder was designed. The preliminary study
presented here opens however some important questions, which will
be addressed in our future research:
1. The accuracy in estimating the collusion channel, and its im-
pact in decoding performance.
2. How to ﬁx the decoding threshold   so as to guarantee an
objective error probability.
3. The impact of time varying collusion attacks.
4. The possibility of using the proposed decoder as a building
block for implementing an affordable approximation of the
joint decoder, which is currently a kind of holy graal for opti-
mal traitor tracing [2],[3].
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